新興市場是否忘了結構性改革

You often hear economists and investors talk thesedays about the ‘broken growth model’ in emergingmarkets. It isn’t a terribly precise term but it’s easy to see what people mean. The problem inEM is that none of the three possible sources of GDP growth – exports, or public domesticspending, or private domestic spending – have much going for them.

如今你經常聽到經濟學家和投資者談論新興市場“增長模式破產。這不是一個特別準確的術語，但我們不難看出人們所指的意思。新興市場的問題在于，國內生產總值(GDP)的三個可能增長源頭——出口、公共國內支出和私人國內消費——沒有一個是強勁的。

Exports from EM are hobbled by a collapse in the growth of global trade and the related fall inworld commodity prices. Public spending growth is weak because many governments are toonervous to loosen fiscal policy, fearing a loss of sovereign creditworthiness at a time when theoutlook for capital inflows isn’t encouraging. And private domestic spending is hampered bythe fact that credit markets in many countries are in ‘post-boom’ mode: neither domesticlenders nor borrowers have much in the way of risk appetite.

全球貿易增速劇減以及相關的世界大宗商品價格下跌，重創了新興市場的出口。公共支出增長很弱，原因在于許多政府過于緊張、不敢放松財政政策，擔心在資本流入前景不妙之際喪失主權信譽。私人國內消費受到了許多國家的信貸市場處于‘后繁榮’狀態的抑制：國內的貸款機構和借款者兩方面都沒有多少風險偏好。

All this helps to explain why emerging markets GDP growth, on average, should fall below 4per cent this year for the first time since 2001.

這一切有助于解釋，為何今年的新興市場平均GDP增速應該會自2001年以來首次降到4%以下。

Faced with this state of affairs, you might think countries would be falling over themselves toreform their economies: reducing barriers to economic activity, de-clogging product markets,reducing regulation, making additional effort to seek new inflows of foreign direct investment.Yet most economists and investors with any knowledge of emerging markets would only beable to name two countries which have a definable reform strategy that is being more or lessimplemented: India and Mexico.

面對這種局面，你或許會以為，新興市場國家將競相推行經濟改革：降低經濟活動門檻，疏通產品市場，減少監管，加倍努力尋求新的外國直接投資(FDI)。不過，大多數了解新興市場的經濟學家和投資者只能列出兩個國家具有比較明確的改革戰略、而且或多或少在執行戰略：印度和墨西哥。

Why are so few countries embracing reform? To see why, you need to think back to the early2000s, when emerging economies were just, well, emerging from two decades ofintermittent financial crises. Looking back on the grim experiences of the 1980s and 1990s –crises in Latin America, Asia, Russia, Turkey and others – the biggest question at the start ofthe 2000s was ‘what on earth is it that’s making developing countries so susceptible to crisis?’And the answer seemed clear. The problem in emerging markets was overwhelminglydescribed as a problem to do with weak sovereign balance sheets: too much public debt, toomuch of it denominated in foreign currencies, and too much of it needing to be repaid too soon.

為何擁抱改革的國家如此之少?若要知道原因，你需要回想一下本世紀初的情況，那時新興經濟體剛剛走出持續20年斷斷續續的金融危機?；貞浺幌律鲜兰o80和90年代的可怕經歷吧——拉美、亞洲、俄羅斯和土耳其等地的危機——本世紀初的最大問題是，“究竟是什么因素導致發展中國家這么容易爆發危機?答案似乎顯而易見。新興市場的問題被多數人描述為與主權資產負債表薄弱有關：公共債務太高，其中以外幣計價的債務比例太高，需要很快償付的比例也太高。

Structural reform was certainly part of the debate, but not too central to it.

那時，結構改革當然是辯論的議題之一，但并非核心議題。

This analysis spurred action: policymakers in developing countries made strenuous efforts tostrengthen their public sector balance sheets during the 2000s: reducing debt/GDP ratios,cutting the amount owed in dollars, accumulating foreign reserves and extending the maturityprofile of government bonds. Indeed, the 2000s saw a dramatic improvement in the health ofsovereign balance sheets: the average debt/GDP ratio in EM fell from over 60 per cent in theearly 2000s to just over 40 per cent nowadays.

有關主權資產負債表薄弱的分析結果引發了行動：在本世紀頭10年，發展中國家的政策制定者在強化公共部門的資產負債表方面下了很大功夫：降低債務/GDP比率，減少美元債務數量，積累外匯儲備，從總體上延長政府債券的年期。的確，在本世紀頭10年里，主權資產負債表的健康狀況大為好轉：新興市場的平均債務/GDP比率從21世紀初的60%以上，降低到如今的略高于40%。

That felt like enough, since the 2000s wrapped these countries in the warm embrace of rapidChinese growth, plenty of external financing, and unusually strong import growth in thedeveloped world. So, structural reform was crowded out by an intellectual emphasis on thecentral importance of balance sheets, aided by an exceptionally friendly world economy thatmade EM policymakers feel that whatever it was they were doing, it was working.

這給人的感覺是足夠了，因為在本世紀頭10年里，這些國家極大地受益于中國快速增長、充足外部資金和異常強勁的發達世界進口增長。結構性改革被排擠掉了，因為學術界強調資產負債表的核心重要性，而極其有利的世界經濟促使新興市場的政策制定者覺得，無論他們在做什么，他們的行動都很靈驗。

Now that the global economic temperature is much colder, what we’re learning is that having astrong sovereign balance sheet is at best a necessary – but not a sufficient – condition forenjoying stable growth. A business climate that supports animal spirits is needed too, more sotoday than any time in the recent past.

現在既然全球經濟溫度低了很多，我們學到的教益是，擁有強大的主權資產負債表充其量是享有穩定增長的必要條件，而不是充分條件。還需要一種支持“動物精神的商業氛圍，與近年任何時候相比，如今更是如此。

But it takes time for countries to reach that conclusion. Look at Mexico, for example. Onereason that Mexicans ended up electing a President in 2023 who was committed to properstructural reform – in energy, telecoms, education and labour above all – was that its economicperformance had been dismal for over 30 years.

但各國需要一定的時間才能得出這個結論。以墨西哥為例。2023年，墨西哥人選出了一位承諾認真推行結構性改革(最重要的是能源、電信、教育以及勞動力市場改革)的總統，原因之一在于，該國的經濟表現令人沮喪已有30余年了。

The 1980s were ‘lost’ as a result of a debt crisis; the 1990s were overshadowed by China’s1993 devaluation and the subsequent Tequila crisis in late 1994; and in the 2000s Mexico wasone of the few countries in the developing world that failed to benefit from China’s rise, sinceChina’s membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 allowed its exporters tocapture market share from, above all, Mexico. Between 1980 and 2010, emerging economiesas a whole enjoyed GDP growth of 4.5 per cent on average. Mexico rubbed along with just 2.6per cent. And it was this persistently weak economic performance which gave the countryplenty of time to come up with a diagnosis, and elect a President aiming to do something aboutit (not that his effort has been an unqualified success).

一場債務危機使墨西哥“失去了上世紀80年代;90年代，墨西哥受到1993年中國人民幣貶值和1994年末特基拉危機的影響;本世紀頭10年，墨西哥是未能受益于中國崛起的少數發展中國家之一，因為2001年中國加入世貿組織(WTO)使得中國出口商從其他國家那里奪取了市場份額，首當其沖的便是墨西哥。1980年至2010年間，新興經濟體整體的平均GDP增速達到4.5%。墨西哥則只有2.6%。正是這種持續疲弱的經濟表現，讓墨西哥舉國上下有很多時間得出診斷結果，最終選舉出一位有意采取相應行動的總統(當然他的努力也并未取得絕對成功)。

Let’s hope that it doesn’t take too many countries a generation to discover the need forstructural reforms, or the ‘growth model’ may stay broken for a depressingly long time.

我們希望，不要有太多的國家需要一代人的時間才能發現結構性改革的必要性，否則的話，當前“增長模式或許會失靈很久。

But here’s a dilemma. One of the gravest structural deficiencies in EM is poor infrastructure.Yet improving this will almost certainly require funding from the public sector. So countries mayfind themselves with a difficult choice: is it better to maintain as strong a public balance sheet aspossible in order to keep your country’s borrowing costs low? Or is it worth tolerating higherpublic debt levels in order to finance infrastructure? The outlook for EM growth would be a lotmore rosy if there was an easy answer to that question.

但這里有個兩難。新興市場的最嚴重結構性缺陷之一是基礎設施薄弱。但是，改善基礎設施將幾乎肯定需要公共部門資金。所以，這些國家或許會發現自己面臨一個棘手選擇：維持盡可能強大的公共部門資產負債表、以便把國家的借款成本保持在低水平?還是忍受更高的公共債務水平、以便為完善基礎設施提供資金支持?如果這個問題有輕松的答案，新興市場增長的前景就將美好得多。

You often hear economists and investors talk thesedays about the ‘broken growth model’ in emergingmarkets. It isn’t a terribly precise term but it’s easy to see what people mean. The problem inEM is that none of the three possible sources of GDP growth – exports, or public domesticspending, or private domestic spending – have much going for them.

如今你經常聽到經濟學家和投資者談論新興市場“增長模式破產。這不是一個特別準確的術語，但我們不難看出人們所指的意思。新興市場的問題在于，國內生產總值(GDP)的三個可能增長源頭——出口、公共國內支出和私人國內消費——沒有一個是強勁的。

Exports from EM are hobbled by a collapse in the growth of global trade and the related fall inworld commodity prices. Public spending growth is weak because many governments are toonervous to loosen fiscal policy, fearing a loss of sovereign creditworthiness at a time when theoutlook for capital inflows isn’t encouraging. And private domestic spending is hampered bythe fact that credit markets in many countries are in ‘post-boom’ mode: neither domesticlenders nor borrowers have much in the way of risk appetite.

全球貿易增速劇減以及相關的世界大宗商品價格下跌，重創了新興市場的出口。公共支出增長很弱，原因在于許多政府過于緊張、不敢放松財政政策，擔心在資本流入前景不妙之際喪失主權信譽。私人國內消費受到了許多國家的信貸市場處于‘后繁榮’狀態的抑制：國內的貸款機構和借款者兩方面都沒有多少風險偏好。

All this helps to explain why emerging markets GDP growth, on average, should fall below 4per cent this year for the first time since 2001.

這一切有助于解釋，為何今年的新興市場平均GDP增速應該會自2001年以來首次降到4%以下。

Faced with this state of affairs, you might think countries would be falling over themselves toreform their economies: reducing barriers to economic activity, de-clogging product markets,reducing regulation, making additional effort to seek new inflows of foreign direct investment.Yet most economists and investors with any knowledge of emerging markets would only beable to name two countries which have a definable reform strategy that is being more or lessimplemented: India and Mexico.

面對這種局面，你或許會以為，新興市場國家將競相推行經濟改革：降低經濟活動門檻，疏通產品市場，減少監管，加倍努力尋求新的外國直接投資(FDI)。不過，大多數了解新興市場的經濟學家和投資者只能列出兩個國家具有比較明確的改革戰略、而且或多或少在執行戰略：印度和墨西哥。

Why are so few countries embracing reform? To see why, you need to think back to the early2000s, when emerging economies were just, well, emerging from two decades ofintermittent financial crises. Looking back on the grim experiences of the 1980s and 1990s –crises in Latin America, Asia, Russia, Turkey and others – the biggest question at the start ofthe 2000s was ‘what on earth is it that’s making developing countries so susceptible to crisis?’And the answer seemed clear. The problem in emerging markets was overwhelminglydescribed as a problem to do with weak sovereign balance sheets: too much public debt, toomuch of it denominated in foreign currencies, and too much of it needing to be repaid too soon.

為何擁抱改革的國家如此之少?若要知道原因，你需要回想一下本世紀初的情況，那時新興經濟體剛剛走出持續20年斷斷續續的金融危機?；貞浺幌律鲜兰o80和90年代的可怕經歷吧——拉美、亞洲、俄羅斯和土耳其等地的危機——本世紀初的最大問題是，“究竟是什么因素導致發展中國家這么容易爆發危機?答案似乎顯而易見。新興市場的問題被多數人描述為與主權資產負債表薄弱有關：公共債務太高，其中以外幣計價的債務比例太高，需要很快償付的比例也太高。

Structural reform was certainly part of the debate, but not too central to it.

那時，結構改革當然是辯論的議題之一，但并非核心議題。

This analysis spurred action: policymakers in developing countries made strenuous efforts tostrengthen their public sector balance sheets during the 2000s: reducing debt/GDP ratios,cutting the amount owed in dollars, accumulating foreign reserves and extending the maturityprofile of government bonds. Indeed, the 2000s saw a dramatic improvement in the health ofsovereign balance sheets: the average debt/GDP ratio in EM fell from over 60 per cent in theearly 2000s to just over 40 per cent nowadays.

有關主權資產負債表薄弱的分析結果引發了行動：在本世紀頭10年，發展中國家的政策制定者在強化公共部門的資產負債表方面下了很大功夫：降低債務/GDP比率，減少美元債務數量，積累外匯儲備，從總體上延長政府債券的年期。的確，在本世紀頭10年里，主權資產負債表的健康狀況大為好轉：新興市場的平均債務/GDP比率從21世紀初的60%以上，降低到如今的略高于40%。

That felt like enough, since the 2000s wrapped these countries in the warm embrace of rapidChinese growth, plenty of external financing, and unusually strong import growth in thedeveloped world. So, structural reform was crowded out by an intellectual emphasis on thecentral importance of balance sheets, aided by an exceptionally friendly world economy thatmade EM policymakers feel that whatever it was they were doing, it was working.

這給人的感覺是足夠了，因為在本世紀頭10年里，這些國家極大地受益于中國快速增長、充足外部資金和異常強勁的發達世界進口增長。結構性改革被排擠掉了，因為學術界強調資產負債表的核心重要性，而極其有利的世界經濟促使新興市場的政策制定者覺得，無論他們在做什么，他們的行動都很靈驗。

Now that the global economic temperature is much colder, what we’re learning is that having astrong sovereign balance sheet is at best a necessary – but not a sufficient – condition forenjoying stable growth. A business climate that supports animal spirits is needed too, more sotoday than any time in the recent past.

現在既然全球經濟溫度低了很多，我們學到的教益是，擁有強大的主權資產負債表充其量是享有穩定增長的必要條件，而不是充分條件。還需要一種支持“動物精神的商業氛圍，與近年任何時候相比，如今更是如此。

But it takes time for countries to reach that conclusion. Look at Mexico, for example. Onereason that Mexicans ended up electing a President in 2023 who was committed to properstructural reform – in energy, telecoms, education and labour above all – was that its economicperformance had been dismal for over 30 years.

但各國需要一定的時間才能得出這個結論。以墨西哥為例。2023年，墨西哥人選出了一位承諾認真推行結構性改革(最重要的是能源、電信、教育以及勞動力市場改革)的總統，原因之一在于，該國的經濟表現令人沮喪已有30余年了。

The 1980s were ‘lost’ as a result of a debt crisis; the 1990s were overshadowed by China’s1993 devaluation and the subsequent Tequila crisis in late 1994; and in the 2000s Mexico wasone of the few countries in the developing world that failed to benefit from China’s rise, sinceChina’s membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 allowed its exporters tocapture market share from, above all, Mexico. Between 1980 and 2010, emerging economiesas a whole enjoyed GDP growth of 4.5 per cent on average. Mexico rubbed along with just 2.6per cent. And it was this persistently weak economic performance which gave the countryplenty of time to come up with a diagnosis, and elect a President aiming to do something aboutit (not that his effort has been an unqualified success).

一場債務危機使墨西哥“失去了上世紀80年代;90年代，墨西哥受到1993年中國人民幣貶值和1994年末特基拉危機的影響;本世紀頭10年，墨西哥是未能受益于中國崛起的少數發展中國家之一，因為2001年中國加入世貿組織(WTO)使得中國出口商從其他國家那里奪取了市場份額，首當其沖的便是墨西哥。1980年至2010年間，新興經濟體整體的平均GDP增速達到4.5%。墨西哥則只有2.6%。正是這種持續疲弱的經濟表現，讓墨西哥舉國上下有很多時間得出診斷結果，最終選舉出一位有意采取相應行動的總統(當然他的努力也并未取得絕對成功)。

Let’s hope that it doesn’t take too many countries a generation to discover the need forstructural reforms, or the ‘growth model’ may stay broken for a depressingly long time.

我們希望，不要有太多的國家需要一代人的時間才能發現結構性改革的必要性，否則的話，當前“增長模式或許會失靈很久。

But here’s a dilemma. One of the gravest structural deficiencies in EM is poor infrastructure.Yet improving this will almost certainly require funding from the public sector. So countries mayfind themselves with a difficult choice: is it better to maintain as strong a public balance sheet aspossible in order to keep your country’s borrowing costs low? Or is it worth tolerating higherpublic debt levels in order to finance infrastructure? The outlook for EM growth would be a lotmore rosy if there was an easy answer to that question.

但這里有個兩難。新興市場的最嚴重結構性缺陷之一是基礎設施薄弱。但是，改善基礎設施將幾乎肯定需要公共部門資金。所以，這些國家或許會發現自己面臨一個棘手選擇：維持盡可能強大的公共部門資產負債表、以便把國家的借款成本保持在低水平?還是忍受更高的公共債務水平、以便為完善基礎設施提供資金支持?如果這個問題有輕松的答案，新興市場增長的前景就將美好得多。