2023考研英語閱讀拼拼湊湊見真相
Piecing it together
拼拼湊湊見真相
All The Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of theFinancial Crisis. By Bethany McLean and JoeNocera.
《萬魔聚此：金融危機隱藏的歷史》，Bethany McLean和 Joe Nocera著。
The latest book on the financial crisis has an oddtitle. You begin reading All the Devils Are Here, aline from Shakespeare s The Tempest, expectingto encounter satanic bankers and corrupt government cronies preying on a defencelesspublic. In fact the people who emerge are infinitely more interesting: arrogant, desperate,even cluelessbut, with a few exceptions, not devils.
這本最新出爐的討論經濟危機的書有個奇怪的名字。萬魔聚此，讀到這句出自莎士比亞《暴風雨》劇中的對白，你可能會覺得書中講的應該是窮兇極惡的銀行家和與之狼狽為奸的腐敗政府官員如何如何侵害毫無招架之力的公眾。但實際上里面提及的人物卻比這耐人尋味得多：傲慢者、鋌而走險者，甚至還有無知之徒，但除了少數人之外，他們都算不上惡魔。
Take Angelo Mozilo. From the time he started Countrywide Financial in the late 1960s theBronx-born outsider was convinced he could put millions of deserving families in homes,maintain impeccable underwriting standardsand get rich. That became impossible as thesubprime mania grew. By 2006 Mr Mozilo had a Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde quality, the authorsnote, giving warning that disaster loomed while at the same time insisting his companywould still thrive. In fact, Countrywide had become a leading purveyor of toxic mortgageproducts that would take the company to the brink of bankruptcy.
就拿安吉羅莫茲羅來說吧。當他在20世紀60年代末創立全國金融公司時，這位出生在紐約布朗克斯區的門外漢深信，自己能夠幫助數百萬應該得到幫助的家庭獲得一個屬于他們自己的家，同時維持無懈可擊的承保標準 然后發家致富。可是隨著次級貸的熱狂逐步升溫，這一切預想都化為泡影。本書作者指出，到2006年時，莫茲羅先生已經有人格分裂的趨勢了，他一方面發出警告說大難就要臨頭，另一方面卻仍然堅信自己的公司還能興旺發達下去。可事實上，全國金融公司當時已是有毒抵押貸款產品最大的承辦商，這足已讓它瀕臨破產。
Similar tensions prevailed across Wall Street. Inside Merrill Lynch and AIG, senior executivesworried as far back as 2005 and 2006 about their firms exposure to the mortgage market.The Cassandras in these companies were ignored, sidelined or fired, not because their bosseswere corrupt, but because they didn t believe the warnings. Joe Cassano, theshort-tempered head of AIG s infamous financial-products division, worried about creditlosses but apparently not about the possibility of multiple, massive collateral calls, whichproved the firm s undoing. Stan O Neal, Merrill s head, had no idea that his firm hadaccumulated fatal levels of subprime exposure because he had pushed aside the people whomight have warned him. Goldman Sachs was spared the fate of those companies largelybecause its managers listened to its naysayers.
類似的緊張氣氛盛行于華爾街。美林證券和AIG的高管們早在2005年、2006年時就已經開始擔心公司涉足抵押貸款市場將會帶來隱憂。公司內部預見到這種噩運的預言家們被置之不理，得不到重視，甚至被炒了魷魚，原因卻不是因為老板貪污受賄，而是因為他們根本就不相信這些警告。AIG聲名狼藉的金融產品部主管喬-卡薩諾脾氣暴躁，當時他確實對信用損失的狀況不太放心，但卻沒有考慮過可能產生巨量的復合抵押品要求，而這卻最終導致該公司的崩潰。美林證券的頭兒斯坦奧尼爾把本可能規勸警告他的人都打入冷宮，因此根本沒有意識到公司已經累積了致命數額的次級貸。而高盛之所以能夠逃脫這些公司的噩運，很大程度上是因為其高管聽進去了逆耳的忠言。
Much of the history that Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera recount has already appeared innews accounts, books, government investigations and court proceedings. Still, they havesynthesised an impressive amount of that material and supplemented it with their ownreporting to produce a comprehensive and authoritative account. Lesser-known eventsand individuals take on new prominence, such as the 1986 tax law that made it possible toslice up mortgage-backed securities, and the important role played by Ameriquest and itspolitically deft founder, Roland Arnall, in leading the race to the bottom in subprimestandards.
本瑟尼麥克里恩和喬諾瑟拉在書中講述的危機歷史大部分都已經在資訊報道、書籍、政府調查報告和庭審文件中得到披露。不過，他們的長處在于，將數量相當可觀的材料加以整合，并加入自己的獨家報道，形成了關于這場危機歷程的全面而權威的闡述。先前相比較而言被忽略的事件和人物重新得到重視，比如使得拆分抵押證券成為可能的《1986年稅法》，還有阿姆萊奎斯特抵押公司及其政治手腕高桿的創始人羅蘭阿爾諾在主導這場次級貸評定標準直線下降的競賽中所起的重要作用。
Inevitably, some important chapters of the crisis get short shrift. The collapse of BearStearns and Lehman Brothers get only a few pages each, which may not matter so muchbecause they have been so thoroughly covered elsewhere. The macroeconomic forces behindthe bubble, such as low interest rates at home and abroad, are all but ignored. Indeed, theauthors never wander beyond America s shores. Ms McLean and Mr Nocera, who write forVanity Fair and the New York Times, have reporters penchant for detail. The litany ofnames, numbers and financial jargon is at times exhausting, even with the help of aneight-page cast of characters and two-page glossary of acronyms. And there are too manypointless, anonymous quotes.
篇幅有限，危機中的某些重頭戲不可避免地被簡略帶過。對貝爾斯登和雷曼兄弟公司崩潰的討論在書中都只有寥寥幾頁。不過這樣處理也并無不妥，因為它們已經被說爛了。另外，這場泡沫后面的宏觀經濟因素則完全被忽略掉了。兩位作者的關注點始終沒有超出美國的范圍。麥克里恩女士和諾色拉先生為《名利場》和《紐約時報》撰稿，具有記者對細節的強烈偏好。即使坐著列出了長達八頁的人物表和兩頁的縮略語表，文中對人名、數字和金融術語的羅列有時還是讓人吃不消。毫無意義且不知出處的引用也實在太多。
Ultimately, though, their journalistic approach is the central contribution of their book. Itsbalanced and complex portrayal of the roots of the crisis won t satisfy those who really dosee devils at work; but it is closer to the truth.
不過，歸根到底，這本書最大的貢獻就是作者采用的資訊報道立場。書中對這場危機的根源進行的刻畫有些平均，比較復雜。這很難讓確實看到魔鬼們在使壞的人感到滿意;但卻更為接近真相。
Piecing it together
拼拼湊湊見真相
All The Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of theFinancial Crisis. By Bethany McLean and JoeNocera.
《萬魔聚此：金融危機隱藏的歷史》，Bethany McLean和 Joe Nocera著。
The latest book on the financial crisis has an oddtitle. You begin reading All the Devils Are Here, aline from Shakespeare s The Tempest, expectingto encounter satanic bankers and corrupt government cronies preying on a defencelesspublic. In fact the people who emerge are infinitely more interesting: arrogant, desperate,even cluelessbut, with a few exceptions, not devils.
這本最新出爐的討論經濟危機的書有個奇怪的名字。萬魔聚此，讀到這句出自莎士比亞《暴風雨》劇中的對白，你可能會覺得書中講的應該是窮兇極惡的銀行家和與之狼狽為奸的腐敗政府官員如何如何侵害毫無招架之力的公眾。但實際上里面提及的人物卻比這耐人尋味得多：傲慢者、鋌而走險者，甚至還有無知之徒，但除了少數人之外，他們都算不上惡魔。
Take Angelo Mozilo. From the time he started Countrywide Financial in the late 1960s theBronx-born outsider was convinced he could put millions of deserving families in homes,maintain impeccable underwriting standardsand get rich. That became impossible as thesubprime mania grew. By 2006 Mr Mozilo had a Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde quality, the authorsnote, giving warning that disaster loomed while at the same time insisting his companywould still thrive. In fact, Countrywide had become a leading purveyor of toxic mortgageproducts that would take the company to the brink of bankruptcy.
就拿安吉羅莫茲羅來說吧。當他在20世紀60年代末創立全國金融公司時，這位出生在紐約布朗克斯區的門外漢深信，自己能夠幫助數百萬應該得到幫助的家庭獲得一個屬于他們自己的家，同時維持無懈可擊的承保標準 然后發家致富。可是隨著次級貸的熱狂逐步升溫，這一切預想都化為泡影。本書作者指出，到2006年時，莫茲羅先生已經有人格分裂的趨勢了，他一方面發出警告說大難就要臨頭，另一方面卻仍然堅信自己的公司還能興旺發達下去。可事實上，全國金融公司當時已是有毒抵押貸款產品最大的承辦商，這足已讓它瀕臨破產。
Similar tensions prevailed across Wall Street. Inside Merrill Lynch and AIG, senior executivesworried as far back as 2005 and 2006 about their firms exposure to the mortgage market.The Cassandras in these companies were ignored, sidelined or fired, not because their bosseswere corrupt, but because they didn t believe the warnings. Joe Cassano, theshort-tempered head of AIG s infamous financial-products division, worried about creditlosses but apparently not about the possibility of multiple, massive collateral calls, whichproved the firm s undoing. Stan O Neal, Merrill s head, had no idea that his firm hadaccumulated fatal levels of subprime exposure because he had pushed aside the people whomight have warned him. Goldman Sachs was spared the fate of those companies largelybecause its managers listened to its naysayers.
類似的緊張氣氛盛行于華爾街。美林證券和AIG的高管們早在2005年、2006年時就已經開始擔心公司涉足抵押貸款市場將會帶來隱憂。公司內部預見到這種噩運的預言家們被置之不理，得不到重視，甚至被炒了魷魚，原因卻不是因為老板貪污受賄，而是因為他們根本就不相信這些警告。AIG聲名狼藉的金融產品部主管喬-卡薩諾脾氣暴躁，當時他確實對信用損失的狀況不太放心，但卻沒有考慮過可能產生巨量的復合抵押品要求，而這卻最終導致該公司的崩潰。美林證券的頭兒斯坦奧尼爾把本可能規勸警告他的人都打入冷宮，因此根本沒有意識到公司已經累積了致命數額的次級貸。而高盛之所以能夠逃脫這些公司的噩運，很大程度上是因為其高管聽進去了逆耳的忠言。
Much of the history that Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera recount has already appeared innews accounts, books, government investigations and court proceedings. Still, they havesynthesised an impressive amount of that material and supplemented it with their ownreporting to produce a comprehensive and authoritative account. Lesser-known eventsand individuals take on new prominence, such as the 1986 tax law that made it possible toslice up mortgage-backed securities, and the important role played by Ameriquest and itspolitically deft founder, Roland Arnall, in leading the race to the bottom in subprimestandards.
本瑟尼麥克里恩和喬諾瑟拉在書中講述的危機歷史大部分都已經在資訊報道、書籍、政府調查報告和庭審文件中得到披露。不過，他們的長處在于，將數量相當可觀的材料加以整合，并加入自己的獨家報道，形成了關于這場危機歷程的全面而權威的闡述。先前相比較而言被忽略的事件和人物重新得到重視，比如使得拆分抵押證券成為可能的《1986年稅法》，還有阿姆萊奎斯特抵押公司及其政治手腕高桿的創始人羅蘭阿爾諾在主導這場次級貸評定標準直線下降的競賽中所起的重要作用。
Inevitably, some important chapters of the crisis get short shrift. The collapse of BearStearns and Lehman Brothers get only a few pages each, which may not matter so muchbecause they have been so thoroughly covered elsewhere. The macroeconomic forces behindthe bubble, such as low interest rates at home and abroad, are all but ignored. Indeed, theauthors never wander beyond America s shores. Ms McLean and Mr Nocera, who write forVanity Fair and the New York Times, have reporters penchant for detail. The litany ofnames, numbers and financial jargon is at times exhausting, even with the help of aneight-page cast of characters and two-page glossary of acronyms. And there are too manypointless, anonymous quotes.
篇幅有限，危機中的某些重頭戲不可避免地被簡略帶過。對貝爾斯登和雷曼兄弟公司崩潰的討論在書中都只有寥寥幾頁。不過這樣處理也并無不妥，因為它們已經被說爛了。另外，這場泡沫后面的宏觀經濟因素則完全被忽略掉了。兩位作者的關注點始終沒有超出美國的范圍。麥克里恩女士和諾色拉先生為《名利場》和《紐約時報》撰稿，具有記者對細節的強烈偏好。即使坐著列出了長達八頁的人物表和兩頁的縮略語表，文中對人名、數字和金融術語的羅列有時還是讓人吃不消。毫無意義且不知出處的引用也實在太多。
Ultimately, though, their journalistic approach is the central contribution of their book. Itsbalanced and complex portrayal of the roots of the crisis won t satisfy those who really dosee devils at work; but it is closer to the truth.
不過，歸根到底，這本書最大的貢獻就是作者采用的資訊報道立場。書中對這場危機的根源進行的刻畫有些平均，比較復雜。這很難讓確實看到魔鬼們在使壞的人感到滿意;但卻更為接近真相。
